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INTRODUCTION 
Peremptory challenges have existed since the early days of the 
common law.1 Many believe that peremptory challenges help 
prosecutors ensure fair and impartial juries.2 Prosecutors often, 
however, use peremptory strikes for discriminatory purposes. The 
Supreme Court introduced a test in Batson v. Kentucky3 to evaluate 
whether peremptory strikes used on potential jurors were based on 
racial discrimination. Implementing the ambiguous Batson test has 
proven extremely difficult. Social scientists have found that 
prosecutors still commonly use race as a factor in selecting juries, and 
black jurors remain underrepresented relative to their proportion of 
the population in many jurisdictions,4 which suggests the Batson test 
has failed to effectuate its purpose. 
The question presented in Foster v. Chatman5 is whether the state 
habeas court erred when it held that the prosecution’s use of 
peremptory strikes was not a violation of the Batson test. According 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017 . 
 1.  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 639 (1991) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (describing the common law heritage of peremptory challenges). 
 2.  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986). 
 3.  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 4.  See, e.g., Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The 
Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital 
Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1533 (2012) (finding Batson is under-enforced in North Carolina); 
David C. Baldus, et. al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal 
and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 10 (2001) (finding both prosecutors and 
defense attorneys commonly use racially-motivated peremptory strikes in Philadelphia capital 
murder cases). 
 5.  NO. 14-8349 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2015). 
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to the habeas court, new evidence uncovered by Foster failed to show 
that the trial court committed clear error when the trial court 
accepted the race-neutral reasons the prosecution offered for striking 
all potential black jurors from Foster’s trial jury. Cases like Foster’s 
are far from unique. While the Court has found Batson violations in 
several instances, state trial and appellate courts rarely rule in favor of 
a Batson challenge.6 
This Commentary argues the Court in Foster v. Chatman should 
rule that prosecutorial strikes constitute race discrimination 
prohibited by Batson. The prosecutorial notes presented by Foster 
show strong evidence of discrimination against black potential jurors, 
circumstances closely similar to those in Miller-El v. Dretke,7 in which 
the Court accepted a Batson challenge. Ruling in favor of the State 
would prevent Batson relief in the very situation the test was designed 
to remedy. Additionally, such a ruling would prevent the Court from 
refining the Batson test in order to halt courts from automatically 
accepting any race-neutral explanation presented by prosecutors. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 27, 1986, Petitioner Timothy Foster broke into the 
home of 79-year-old Queen Madge White.8 He broke her jaw with a 
fireplace log and sexually molested her with a salad dressing bottle.9 
Finally, Foster strangled White to death and took several items from 
White’s home before he left.10 The next morning, White’s sister found 
the body, which was covered in a blanket to her neck and coated with 
talcum powder.11 A month later, Foster was arrested.12 While searching 
Foster’s home, police recovered several of White’s possessions.13 
During an interrogation following his arrest, Foster confessed to 
White’s murder.14 
 
 6.  Equal Justice Initiative, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing 
Legacy at 13–27 (Aug. 2010), http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%20Race%20and%20Jury% 
20Report.pdf. 
 7.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
 8.  Brief of Respondent at 3, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2015) 
[hereinafter Brief of Respondent]. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d, 188, 190 (Ga. 1988). 
 12.  Id. at 736 n.1. 
 13.  Id. at 736. 
 14.  Id. 
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Four months prior to the start of jury selection for Foster’s trial, 
the defense sought to prevent the prosecution from using peremptory 
challenges to exclude black prospective jurors and to require the 
prosecution to provide an explanation for any decision to strike a 
black prospective juror.15  The pool of jurors for Foster’s trial 
consisted of ninety-five prospective jurors, ten of whom were black.16 
Each prospective juror filled out a questionnaire and underwent 
individual voir dire,17 and after that process, forty-two prospective 
jurors remained.18 The prosecution used four of its ten peremptory 
strikes to remove the four qualified black prospective jurors. The 
result was an all-white jury.19 The prosecution had highlighted all of 
the black prospective jurors in green, and identified the black jurors 
with a “B.”20 Furthermore, the qualified black prospective jurors were 
listed first in the prosecution’s “Definite NO” column—meaning that 
they were at the very top of the list to be excluded.21 Nevertheless, the 
prosecution claimed that race was not a factor in striking the black 
prospective jurors, and provided a list of eight to twelve race-neutral 
reasons for each strike.22 
The jury convicted Foster of malice murder and burglary and 
sentenced him to death.23 Foster issued an appeal to the Georgia 
Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction, finding that the strikes 
were “sufficiently neutral and legitimate.”24 Foster filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus with the Superior Court of Butts County, 
Georgia in 1989, claiming that he had an intellectual disability that 
rendered him ineligible for the death penalty under Georgia law.25 In 
1999, the Superior Court of Floyd County, Georgia held a trial to 
assess Foster’s intellectual state.26 The jury determined that Foster did 
not meet the standard for exclusion, and the habeas case resumed in 
Butts County.27 In 2006, Foster’s counsel obtained the prosecution’s 
 
 15.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
 16.  Brief of Petitioner at 4–5, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. July 24, 2015) 
[hereinafter Brief of Petitioner]. 
 17.  Id. at 5. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 2. 
 20.  Id. at 3. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 2–3. 
 23.  Id. at 736. 
 24.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 15, at 12–13 (citation omitted). 
 25.  Id. at 13. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
DALY FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2016  12:08 PM 
152 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 11 
jury selection notes from Foster’s 1987 trial.28 It was then that Foster 
discovered that the prospective black jurors had been earmarked by 
race.29 However, the Superior Court of Butts County, which acted as 
Foster’s habeas court, denied relief in 2013. The habeas court found 
that Foster’s Batson claim lacked merit because he failed to show 
discrimination.30 Foster issued an application for a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal with the Georgia Supreme Court, which was 
denied on November 3, 2014.31 The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on May 26, 201532 to review Foster’s racial 
discrimination claim under the Batson test.33 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that, while 
prosecutors are entitled to peremptory challenges, “the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors 
solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors 
as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case 
against a black defendant.”34 In his opinion, Justice Powell illustrated 
that the Court has long protected defendants from prosecutors 
purposefully removing members of the defendant’s race from the jury 
pool.35 According to the court, “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in 
the selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal 
protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is 
intended to secure.”36 While prosecutors are generally allowed to use 
peremptory strikes for any reason, the Court in Batson  recognized 
that the Equal Protection Clause places “some limits on the State’s 
exercise of peremptory challenges.”37 
 
 
 28.  Id. at 14. 
 29.  See id. at 14–19 (describing the notes Foster received from the prosecution). 
 30.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 10. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 1. 
 33.  Id. at i. 
 34.  Id. at 80. 
 35.  Id. at 84–85. See also Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879), abrogated by 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that excluding black jurors violated a black 
defendant’s rights); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (stating that denying blacks participation on juries was a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 36.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. 
 37.  Id. at 91. 
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In Batson and its progeny, the Supreme Court has laid out a three-
step process to establish that prosecutors unlawfully discriminated in 
issuing their peremptory strikes.38 First, the defendant must make out 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination involving peremptory 
strikes.39 Second, the prosecution will present a race-neutral 
explanation for its actions.40 Third, the trial court will consider the 
evidence presented and decide whether it finds evidence proving 
intentional racial discrimination.41 
In the first step of a Batson challenge, the defendant needs to 
demonstrate membership in a certain racial group and establish that 
the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove prospective jurors 
belonging to that racial group.42 Additionally, the defendant must 
present facts from which the court could infer the prosecutor 
discriminated to exclude prospective jurors on account of their race.43 
The second step of a Batson analysis begins once the defendant 
shows racial discrimination.44 It is then up to the prosecution to come 
forward with a neutral explanation for striking members of the 
defendant’s race.45 As peremptory strikes can be made for any reason 
that is not racially discriminatory,46 the prosecution’s reasoning “does 
not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible”47 as 
long as there is no racially discriminatory intent.48 However, “[a] 
Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any 
rational basis . . . . [P]retextual significance does not fade because a 
trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not 
have shown up as false.”49 
Finally, if the prosecutor fails to present a racially neutral 
explanation for striking the prospective jurors, the trial court has the 
duty of determining if the racial discrimination was intentional.50 The 
 
 38.  See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (explaining the Batson three-part 
test). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 97. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 79–80. 
 47.  Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 
 48.  Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)). 
 49.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005). 
 50.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). 
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trial court’s “rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit 
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional 
discrimination.”51 The trial court’s ruling is generally sustained on 
appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.52 
III.  HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Georgia determined that Foster’s renewed 
Batson v. Kentucky claim was without merit.53 The court therefore 
denied Foster’s Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to 
appeal the denial of habeas corpus.54 
Although Foster made several legal claims in his habeas corpus 
petition to the Superior Court of Butts County, only the Batson claim 
will be reviewed on this appeal.55 The habeas court applied the three-
step Batson analysis to Foster’s claim.56 As Foster’s case reached the 
third and final step of Batson analysis, the court determined whether 
or not the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for striking black 
potential jurors “were a pretext for purposeful discrimination.”57 
After examining the record, the habeas court found that “all 
jurors in this case, regardless of race, were thoroughly investigated 
and considered before the State exercised its peremptory 
challenges.”58 The court leaned heavily on the testimony of the 
prosecutors,59 and fully accepted the prosecution’s explanation that 
the notes made about the prospective jurors were not intended to 
discriminate based on race.60 The court also distinguished Foster’s case 
from those he cited.61 
 
 
 51.  St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). 
 52.  Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 
352, 369 (1991) (plurality opinion)). 
 53.  Order Denying Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal at 1, Foster v. 
Humphrey, No. S14E0771 (Ga. Nov. 3, 2014). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Order Denying Petitioner’s Request for Habeas Relief at 14, Foster v. Humphrey, No. 
1989-V-2275 (Ga. Super. Dec. 4, 2014). 
 56.  Id. at 15. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 17. 
 59.  Id. at 16–17. 
 60.  See id. (accepting the investigator’s explanation that his notes were meant to compile 
information about each juror in order to “help pick a fair jury”). 
 61.  Id. at 16 (describing that the court viewed the facts of Foster’s case differently than 
those facts in Miller-El v. Dretke and Adkinds v. Warden, Holman CF because the race of all 
potential jurors was marked). 
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The Superior Court of Butts County determined that Foster failed 
to present evidence proving that the prosecutor purposefully 
discriminated in exercising its peremptory strikes.62 Additionally, the 
court found that the State “offered evidence sufficient to rebut 
[Foster’s] claim.”63 In making its decision, the court emphasized that 
both the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court denied Foster’s 
initial Batson claims.64 Agreeing with the initial 1988 review of the 
Georgia Supreme Court, which stated that “the prosecutor’s 
explanations were related to the case to be tried, and were clear and 
reasonably specific,”65 the habeas court denied Foster’s assertion of a 
Batson claim. In its denial of Foster’s Application for Certificate of 
Probable Cause to appeal the denial of habeas corpus, the Georgia 
Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning of the habeas court.66 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Foster’s Arguments 
Foster argues that the prosecution intentionally struck black 
prospective jurors to achieve an all-white jury.67 According to Foster, 
“[t]he evidence of racial motive by the prosecution in this racially 
charged capital case is extensive and undeniable.”68 Thus, Foster 
argues that the State’s actions are enough to meet the standard set by 
step three of the Batson v. Kentucky analysis.69 
First, Foster argues that the prosecution displayed discriminatory 
intent in its evaluation of the jurors, as evidenced by a “sharp focus on 
the race of the prospective jurors.”70 Foster pointed to several pieces 
of evidence from which to infer racial motivation. For example, the 
names of the black prospective jurors were highlighted, their names 
were designated with a “B,” and their race was circled on the jury 
questionnaires.71 Furthermore, the prosecution only compiled a list of 
 
 62.  Id. at 17. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See Order Denying Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal at 1, 
Foster v. Humphrey, No. S14E0771 (Ga. Nov. 3, 2014). 
 67.  See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 26. 
 68.  Id. at 21. 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  Id. at 26. 
 71.  Id. at 26–27 (citing Joint Appendix at 253–76, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. 
July 24, 2015)). 
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notes on black prospective jurors.72 Foster presents the fact that not a 
single black juror was chosen to serve on the jury as the most glaring 
evidence of intentional racial discrimination.73 
Second, Foster contends that the evidence discredits the reasons 
for striking the black prospective jurors proffered by the prosecution. 
According to Foster, the prosecution “exaggerated facts to make the 
black panelists seem problematic, gave reasons that also applied to 
white prospective jurors, and contradicted themselves and their own 
notes.”74 For example, one of the myriad reasons given for striking 
thirty-four-year-old Marilyn Garrett was her young age, but a white 
twenty-one-year-old, however, was allowed to serve on the jury.75 
Furthermore, Garrett’s employment as an aide at a Head Start 
program was another reason presented to explain her strike.76 
According to the prosecution, Garrett was likely sympathetic to 
disadvantaged children, which was relevant as Foster had grown up 
poor.77 Two white jurors, however, were selected because they were 
teachers, like the murder victim, and were thus viewed as likely to 
display sympathy towards the victim.78 The prosecutors tried to justify 
this discrepancy by claiming that Garrett’s position as a Head Start 
aide made her a social worker, not a teacher.79 
Similarly, Foster argues that black prospective juror Eddie Hood 
was treated in a manner inconsistent with the treatment of white 
prospective jurors. For example, the prosecution phrased questions 
differently when questioning Hood than it did while questioning 
whites.80 While Hood’s membership in the Church of Christ was used 
to strike him, white Church of Christ members were not struck on the 
basis of their religion.81 Foster also notes that the prosecution had 
“problems with the demeanor of all four [black] prospective jurors.”82 
 
 72.  Id. at 27. 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  Id. at 28–29. 
 75.  Id. at 32 (citations omitted). 
 76.  Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 56, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. July 24, 2015)). 
 77.  See id. (citation omitted). 
 78.  Id. at 33–34 (citation omitted). 
 79.  See id. 
 80.  See id. at 41 (citation omitted) (explaining that the prosecutors encouraged white 
prospective jurors to demonstrate their ability to be fair and impartial, but that the prosecutors 
gave no such encouragement to Hood). 
 81.  Id. at 44–45 (citation omitted). 
 82.  Id. at 37 (citing Joint Appendix at 51–53, 55, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. July 
24, 2015)). 
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Finally, Foster asserts that the Court should not give deference to 
the decision of the Georgia habeas court, as the habeas court relied 
on the rulings of the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court.83 
Foster argues that the state habeas court should not have deferred to 
the holdings of the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court 
because those courts did not have the new evidence of purposeful 
racial discrimination: the prosecution’s notes.84 Thus, Foster contends 
that the court “failed to give meaningful consideration to ‘all relevant 
circumstances’ as Batson requires.”85 
B.  The State of Georgia’s Arguments 
The State of Georgia argues that the habeas court did not commit 
clear error when it rejected Foster’s Batson claim.86 According to the 
State, Foster failed to provide the habeas court with facts sufficient to 
overturn the findings of the Georgia Supreme Court and failed to 
prove discriminatory intent.87 The State argues that the new 
documents presented by Foster are simply work product aiming to 
adequately document peremptory strikes in a manner that would beat 
Foster’s inevitable Batson claim. Thus, the State contends that the new 
evidence still fails to meet the third step of a valid Batson claim.88 
The State contends that the state habeas court committed no clear 
error in finding that Foster’s new evidence failed to show that 
prosecutors used discriminatory intent in using their peremptory 
strikes.89 In fact, the State argues that none of the new evidence shows 
any intent to discriminate.90 It views the new evidence as flawed for 
two reasons. First, Foster’s interpretation of the prosecution’s notes 
was speculative, as the two prosecutors who handled Foster’s jury trial 
were never called to the stand and interrogated.91 In sworn affidavits 
before the state habeas court, Foster’s trial prosecutors testified that 
their strikes were race-neutral.92 For example, the State justifies the 
investigations the prosecution made into the backgrounds of each 
 
 83.  See id. at 50–52. 
 84.  See id. at 50. 
 85.  Id. at 51 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005)). 
 86.  See Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 16. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See id. at 18–19. 
 89.  See id. at 19. 
 90.  See id. at 20. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 23 (citing Joint Appendix at 168–71, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. July 
24, 2015)). 
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potential juror, explaining that “[it] sought to obtain all the 
information possible on all prospective jurors.”93 Additionally, a black 
investigator defended making notes on prospective jurors who he 
knew personally, and the prosecutor even argued that the State 
actually aimed to select a black juror.94 Second, the State contends 
that, since Foster had filed several motions designed to prohibit 
discriminatory strikes prior to voir dire, the prosecution had ample 
non-discriminatory reasons for marking and highlighting the race of 
the black jurors.95 The prosecution claims that it kept detailed 
information on each black prospective juror to defend against an 
inevitable Batson inquiry.96 
The State also argues that portions of the new evidence actually 
corroborate the State’s stated reasons for using its peremptory strikes 
against the black potential jurors.97 Notes taken by the prosecution 
during voir dire mirror the reasons given during testimony for striking 
both Eddie Hood and Marilyn Garrett.98 According to the State, the 
fact that these were “contemporaneous observations”99 supports the 
legitimacy of the prosecution’s presented reasoning behind striking 
them from the jury. 
The State contends that the state habeas court committed no clear 
error in relying on the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutors’ 
strikes were not pretextual because it accepted the prosecution’s race-
neutral reasons for exercising their peremptory strikes.100 Thus, the 
State argues the habeas court’s approval of the trial court’s Batson 
analysis was proper.101 Furthermore, the State argues that differences 
in the treatment of similarly situated white prospective jurors do not 
amount to an indication of a pretext.102 The State maintains that, while 
black and white prospective jurors might share some similar 
characteristics, jurors are selected based on the sum of all of their 
characteristics,103 so Foster’s new evidence proves very little.104 Thus, 
 
 93.  See id. at 24. 
 94.  Id. at 26 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 74, at 99–100). 
 95.  See id. at 20–21. 
 96.  See id. at 22–23. 
 97.  See id. at 29. 
 98.  Id. at 29–32 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 74, at 303–10). 
 99.  Id. at 30. 
 100.  See id. at 32. 
 101.  See id. (“This was not error, let alone clear error.”). 
 102.  See id. at 33. 
 103.  See id. 
 104.  Id. at 57. 
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the State asks the Court to give deference to the factual finding of the 
habeas court, as it found no purposeful racial discrimination based 
upon the evidence presented by Foster.105 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Foster v. Chatman hinges on whether or not the state habeas court 
erred when it found that the prosecution did not purposefully 
discriminate in issuing its peremptory strikes. Here, the Court 
should—and likely will—hold that the habeas court should have 
found that the prosecution purposefully and strategically used its 
peremptory strikes on the potential black jurors to produce an all-
white jury. 
Although the Supreme Court has rejected Batson challenges 
recently,106 it should rule in Foster’s favor here. The use of strikes 
against black prospective jurors in Foster’s case has much in common 
with other successful Batson challenges, and in some ways is more 
egregious here. For example, the Supreme Court dealt with a case that 
mirrors Foster’s closely in Miller-El v. Dretke.107 In Miller-El, ninety-
one percent of the eligible black jurors were struck by the 
prosecution, a fact which the Court considered to be a “disparity 
unlikely to have been produced by happenstance.”108 In Foster’s case, 
all of the black jurors were struck.109 Furthermore, the prosecution in 
Miller-El struck a black juror for giving a response similar to one 
given by a white juror chosen to serve on the jury.110 In response, 
Miller-El stated that “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a 
black panelist applies just as well to a white panelist allowed to serve, 
that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.”111 This 
suggests that the Court would view the discrepancies between the 
treatment of Marilyn Garrett, Eddie Hood, and white potential jurors 
 
 105.  See id. at 57–58. 
 106.  See Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (holding that the Ninth Circuit should 
not have struck the California Court of Appeal’s reasonable upholding of a prosecutor’s race-
neutral explanations); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006) (finding that the trial court 
correctly found that the prosecutor’s strike based on one juror’s demeanor did not constitute a 
Batson violation). 
 107.  545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
 108.  Id. at 232. 
 109.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 5–6. 
 110.  Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 232–33. (“Here, a black potential juror was excused for 
expressing apprehension about using the death penalty over life imprisonment. However, 
several white potential jurors who voiced similar opinions were chosen for service.”). 
 111.  Id. at 232. 
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by the prosecution in Foster as evidence of discrimination. Likewise, 
several courts have determined that “laundry lists” of race-neutral 
explanations for peremptory strikes are themselves evidence of 
discriminatory intent.112 Here, the prosecution came up with a list of 
eight to twelve reasons113 for striking each qualified black potential 
juror. Thus, the Court has yet another reason to rule in Foster’s favor. 
Given the parallels between Foster’s case and Miller-El, it is very 
unlikely that the Supreme Court will rule differently, especially since 
commentators believe that Miller-El did not succificently clarify the 
Batson test. 
Foster provides an opportunity to fix issues with the Batson test. 
Since its inception, many have been critical of Batson’s effectiveness 
in preventing peremptory strikes.114 Justice Thurgood Marshall was 
cynical about Batson’s potential effectiveness,115 and  Justice Breyer 
has expressed similar skepticism.116 As Justice Marshall predicted, 
Batson has not become an effective weapon against discriminatory 
peremptory strikes. Typically, courts give extreme deference to the 
race-neutral explanations prosecutors give for exercising their strikes. 
It is rare for a trial court to grant a defendant’s Batson claim,117 and 
appellate courts are inconsistent in their handling of Batson claims.118 
In Southern jurisdictions, Batson claims almost always fail.119 Notably, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court has never granted a Batson claim.120  
Widespread denial of Batson claims is not unique to the South. In a 
 
 112.  See, e.g., Sheets v. State, 535 S.E.2d 312, 315 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that a 
“‘laundry list’ of reasons” was evidence of using a pretextual excuse to hide discriminatory 
purpose behind peremptory strike). 
 113.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 22 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 74, at 41–
57). 
 114.  See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 104 
(2008); see also Baldus, et al., supra note 4, at 10 (“The United States Supreme Court decisions 
banning these practices appear to have had only a marginal impact.”); Grosso & O’Brien, supra 
note 4, at 1533 (“Among those who laud its mission, it seems that the only people not 
disappointed in Batson are those who never expected it to work in the first place.”). 
 115.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The 
decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-
selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges 
entirely.”). 
 116.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The complexity 
of this process reflects the difficulty of finding a legal test that will objectively measure the 
inherently subjective reasons that underlie use of a peremptory challenge . . . . Batson embodies 
defects intrinsic to the task.”). 
 117.  See, e.g., Samuel, supra note 114, at 95–96. 
 118.  Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 6, at 19. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 20. 
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study of twenty-four capital cases asserting claims in Pennsylvania, 
not a single claim for Batson relief was granted by state appellate 
courts.121 One commentator theorizes that frustration with this state of 
affairs motivated the Supreme Court to grant certiorari from the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s summary denial of appeal.122 
As blacks still remain underrepresented on Southern juries123 and 
instances of improper peremptory strikes occur frequently,124 it would 
not make sense for the Court to make it harder for defendants to 
successfully assert claims of racial discrimination in the jury selection 
process. The use of discriminatory peremptory strikes erodes trust in 
the judicial system and deprives both jurors and defendants of their 
constitutional rights. As Justice Blackmun wrote in J.E.B. v. Alabama 
ex rel. T.B.,125 “[t]he community is harmed by the State’s participation 
in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable 
loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned 
discrimination in the courtroom engenders.”126 
The Court should raise the threshold prosecutors must meet to 
comply with Batson. Currently, the “race-neutral” bar is easily met by 
coming up with some pretextual excuse. While Justice Breyer and 
some scholars have promulgated the idea of getting rid of peremptory 
strikes entirely,127 this is unlikely to happen, as peremptory strikes are 
still widely considered to be a valuable prosecutorial tool. Instead, the 
Supreme Court should issue a more refined, concrete way of handling 
a Batson analysis in its Foster opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
In Foster v. Chatman, the Court should rule that the prosecution 
acted with discriminatory intent when it used peremptory strikes 
 
 121.  Baldus, et al., supra note 4, at 123 (2001). 
 122.  Rory Little, As the 2015 Term opens: The Court’s unusual Eighth Amendment focus, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (Sep. 21, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/09/as-the-2015-term-opens-the-
courts-unusual-eighth-amendment-focus. 
 123.  Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 6, at 42. 
 124.  Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 4, at 1536 (2012) (“Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
race weighs heavily in decisions to exercise peremptory strikes—a conclusion bolstered by 
systematic research.”). 
 125.  511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 126.  Id. at 140. 
 127.  See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 272 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the random jury selection system in the United Kingdom might be preferable to one with 
peremptory strikes); see generally Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be 
Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV 809 (1997). 
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against all of the qualified black potential jurors. As the facts of 
Foster’s case closely mirror that of prior instances where the Court 
found discrimination, the Court will likely rule in favor of Foster. The 
Court’s ruling should clarify the ambiguity that has surrounded 
Batson since its inception, finally ending the strong deference trial 
and appellate courts give to race-neutral reasons offered by 
prosecutors for their use of peremptory strikes. 
 
